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31 May of 2018 constitutes the main incentive for this article, which is 
based on the contributions of six authors – all of whom have written 
their individual contribution to a section.1  
Furthermore, the different perspectives that the authors take 
supplement and/or complement the contents of another article that is 
published concurrently but separately in this issue of INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES JOURNAL, namely The 2018 Danish “Burqa Ban”: Joining a 
European Trend and Sending a National Message. 
Very briefly, the joint research project that the six authors are 
participants in accommodate both factually investigative and 
reflective aspects and contributions. Their various responses to the 
reality of the Danish burqa ban are comprised of legal analysis and 
assessment at both the national and international levels, and of critical 
discussion and (theoretical, practical) commentary of a philosophical 
nature. The collaborative effort is not limited to the 2018 prohibitive 
measure (cf. law L 219) and the political context for the Danish case. 
As contributors, the authors endeavor to go beyond these factors to, as 
it were, see the larger picture, with a specific view to distilling 
important insights that, in turn, may inspire to further responses. 
As policymakers belong among the stakeholders whom the authors 
hope to inspire with their work, they (the authors) have also 
contributed directly or indirectly to the formulation of a set of general 
recommendations, in effect, best practices. In some instances, 
suggestions from individual authors were “merged” into one 
recommendation for a particular (response) aspect or area. In total, 
four general recommendations resulted. The contents of these, which 
the research director (Dr. Anja Matwijkiw) assumes the responsibility 
for, cover legal doctrine and jurisprudence, informational accuracy, 
multi-stakeholder representation, and increased oversight. 
 
II. Dr. Anna Oriolo: 
Unveiling Europe for the Sake of “Living Together”: The Lawfulness 
of the Ban on Concealing Faces in ECtHR and ECJ Case-Law 
On January 2018, an Italian judge expelled a Muslim trainee 
lawyer wearing a hijab2 from the courtroom at the Regional 
                                                 
1. Note that a special issue on the burqa ban is being planned; to be published in ISJ (2019). 
2. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/24118241>. 
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Administrative Court of Emilia Romagna, in compliance with the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure. Indeed, Article 129 foresees that 
“those who take part in hearings must be bareheaded”. 
In Italy, the case has reopened the doctrinal and political debate on the 
question of balancing the individual right to “manifest” freedom of 
religion against the more general interests of national security, public 
order, and secularism; a debate previously fueled in 2009 by the 
European Court of Human Rights’ Lautsi Judgment on the presence of 
Catholic symbols, such as crucifixes, in Italian public school classrooms.1 
In recent years, a number of other European States have discussed 
or disputed this question in relation to the ban on concealing faces in 
some occupations and situations.2 Undoubtedly, the veiling of women, 
especially with the use of full-face veils, such as the burqa or niqab, 
reflects a traditional interpretation of Islam. This is often perceived as 
a threat to women’s dignity, and hence incompatible with democratic 
standards.  
However, a general prohibition on wearing full-face veils would 
deny women, who freely desire to do so, both the right to respect their 
private life and personal identity, and the freedom to manifest their 
religion or belief “in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. 
For these reasons, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) have been 
called on to examine whether a national legislation introducing a 
general ban on wearing clothing that covers the face constitutes an ill-
advised invasion of individual privacy or may be justified as necessary 
in a democratic society, particularly for security purposes or where the 
public or professional functions of individuals require their religious 
neutrality or seeing their faces.3 
In the S.A.S. v. France case, for example, the ECtHR held that the 
ban on wearing a full-face veil in public imposed by the French Law 
of 11 October 2010 did not constitute a violation of the right to respect 
private and family life, or the right to respect freedom of thought, 
                                                 
1. ECtHR, Case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, Grand Chamber, 
Judgment, 18 March 2011. 
2. Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe on Islam, Islamism, and Islamophobia in Europe. 
3. See Global Justice-Decisions of International Courts And Tribunals, in Global Community 
YILJ (G. Ziccardi Capaldo, General ed.). 
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conscience, and religion, or the prohibition of discrimination under the 
1950 European Convention of Human Rights. The Court emphasized, 
in particular, that respect for the conditions of “living together” (le 
“vivre ensemble”) was a legitimate aim of this restrictive measure. It 
added that even if said ban had specific negative effects on Muslim 
women, who for religious reasons wished to wear the full-face veil in 
public, the relevant measure had an objective and reasonable 
justification, especially as the State had “a wide margin of 
appreciation” as regards general policy questions on which there were 
significant differences of opinion. In the Grand Chamber’s view “the 
voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic 
because it is quite simply incompatible with the fundamental 
requirements of living together in French society and that the 
systematic concealment of the face in public places, contrary to the 
ideal of fraternity, … falls short of the minimum requirement of 
civility that is necessary for social interaction”.1 
Similarly, in the Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium and Dakir v. 
Belgium cases,2 the Court upheld the ban on wearing clothing in 
public that partly or totally covers the face under the Belgian law of 1 
June 2011, ruling that the concern to ensure respect of the minimum 
guarantees of life in society could be regarded as an element of the 
“protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. On this 
interpretation, the ban was justifiable in principle solely to the extent 
that it sought to guarantee the conditions of “living together”. The 
Court also stressed that the State had a broad margin of discretion to 
decide whether and to what extent a restriction on the individuals’ 
right to manifest their religion or convictions was “necessary”. Hence, 
it is a matter of protecting a condition of interaction between 
individuals that the State deemed essential to ensure the functioning of 
a democratic society. The question of whether the full-face veil is 
acceptable in the Belgian public sphere was thus “a choice of society”.  
In the Court’s opinion, the Belgian burqa ban is a measure 
proportionate to the aim pursued, namely, the preservation of the 
                                                 
1. ECtHR, Case of  S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 1 
July 2014, paras. 141-142. 
2. ECtHR, Case of Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, Application No. 37798/13, Grand 
Chamber, Judgment, 11 July 2017; Case Dakir v. Belgium, Application No. 4619/12, 
Second Section, Judgment, 11 July 2017. 
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conditions of “living together” as an element of the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. It therefore held that the contested 
restriction could be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. 
Following the approach taken by the ECtHR and the practice of 
many national courts and institutions,  the ECJ in the G4S Secure 
Solutions An1 and Bougnaoui and ADDH2 cases ruled that wearing a 
veil was contrary to the companies’ policy of neutrality in their 
contact with customers. 
More precisely, the ECJ examined whether an internal rule of an 
undertaking that prohibits the visible wearing of any political, 
philosophical, or religious sign in the workplace could constitute 
direct discrimination based on religion or belief within the meaning of 
the European Union directive on equal treatment in employment and 
occupation.3 The Court concluded, in particular, that the prohibition 
against wearing an Islamic headscarf does not constitute direct 
discrimination based on religion or belief within the meaning of this 
directive.  
By contrast, such prohibition may constitute indirect discrimination 
if establishing that the apparently neutral obligation it imposes places 
those adhering to a particular religion or belief at a particular 
disadvantage.  
However, such indirect discrimination may be objectively justified 
by a legitimate aim, such as the employer’s pursuit of a policy of 
political, philosophical, and religious neutrality in its relations with its 
customers, provided that the means of achieving this aim are 
appropriate and necessary. It is for the competent national judge to 
verify these conditions. 
In the ECJ’s reasoning, in the absence of such a rule, an employer’s 
willingness to take account of a customer’s wishes to no longer have 
the services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf 
cannot be considered a determining occupational requirement within 
the meaning of the directive. 
                                                 
1. ECJ, Samira Achbita, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. 
G4S Secure Solutions NV, Case C-157-15, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 14 March 2017. 
2. ECJ, Asma Bougnaoui, Association de defense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v. 
Micropole Univers SA, Case C-188/15, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 14 March 2017. 
3. EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16). 
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The recent Danish Law L 219 of 31 May 2018 banning garments 
that cover the face has paved the way for new applications for alleged 
violations of individual rights, thus presenting Europe with challenges 
arising from the need to promote, guarantee, and balance diversity and 
freedom.1 
The solution that international jurisprudence proposes is a new 
model of democratic society based on the criterion of “living 
together”, namely, a community where the concept of “respect” for 
the “minimum guarantees of life in society” could be considered an 
element of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and 
hence the legitimate restriction of certain individual rights.   
As regards the ECtHR and ECJ, a possible justification for the 
prohibition of face concealment would thus be the defense of public 
order according to an entirely new legal definition not confined to the 
traditional preservation of tranquility, public health, or safety.  
More precisely and in summary, from the jurisprudential practice 
examined, there would appear to be no substantial legal basis to justify 
a general ban on the full veil as such. Indeed, the prohibition of the 
full veil alone cannot be founded on the principle of religious 
neutrality (given the uncertainty of its religious significance), nor on 
the principle of human dignity (which by its nature implies the 
protection of freedom of self-determination as a parallel aspect of the 
human person),2 nor on the principle of equality of men and women 
(which would seem inappropriate in cases where this form of public 
confinement is voluntary or accepted). 
As the French Conseil d’Etat observed, in view of the substantial 
uncertainties around the scope of the legal bases that might be 
envisaged and the legal risks arising therefrom, together with the risk 
of stigmatizing persons of the Muslim faith, any ban on the full veil 
itself must be ruled out, taking into consideration the broader question 
of the concealment of faces in relation to other garments or 
accessories3 (helmets, masks, hoods) aiming to prevent others from 
seeing one’s face.  
                                                 
1. Living together. Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-century Europe Report of the 
Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, available at  
<https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/2011/KYIV%20WEBSITE/Report%20on%20
diversity.pdf>. 
2. ECtHr, KA and AD v. Belgium, Application No.  42758/98, 17 February 2005. 
3. Study of possible legal grounds for banning the full veil, Report adopted by the Plenary 
General Assembly of the Conseil d’Etat, 25 March 2010. 
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Therefore, in the view of this author, the recent international case-
law on the ban on concealing faces in some occupations and situations 
has led to providing a legal basis to the “non-substantive” notion of 
public order as a precondition for social interaction.  
This non-substantive dimension mainly concerns public morality, 
respect for the dignity of the human person, but also something entirely 
separate with the specific function of representing the “minimum 
requirement for the reciprocal demands and essential guarantees of life in 
society”, such as respect for pluralism.  
As the French Conseil d’Etat also explained, when an individual 
quite fortuitously comes across another (especially in public spaces), 
“he may neither renounce his membership of society, nor cause it to 
be denied by concealing his face from the sight of others to the point 
of being quite unrecognisable. Moreover the same requirements carry 
the more general implication that marks of distinction betokening 
inequality, and recognised as such should be prohibited”.1 
In this perspective, the systematic concealment of the face 
contravenes the principle of equal membership of society for all, and 
could hence be legally banned for the sake of “living together”. 
 
III . Dr. Willie Mack: 
The Islamic Veils: American Perspectives 
Preliminary Remarks 
According to the American Constitution, federal and state 
governments are expected to protect individuals’ rights against 
interference and to defend the republic’s independence against foreign 
and domestic threats.2 As a result of the oath to “support and defend” 
                                                 
1. Id. 
2. Note that the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
interpreted First Amendment religious protections as applicable to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby broadening the scope of enforcement. See JOHN T 
NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, 
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 1100 (3d ed., 
2011); National Archives, The Constitution of the United States [hereinafter U.S. 
Constitution], available at <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-
transcript> (for examples of rights of individuals, inter alia, to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness against interference from other individuals and the government itself per the 
Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution). Note also that the U.S. 
republic is defined as a nation-state, in which the supreme power is held by the people 
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the U.S. Constitution against all enemies under Article VI, there is a 
tension between these two sets of protections.1 Ostensibly, each nation 
– like each state in the U.S. – protects that particular individual as well 
as the public as it sees fit. Accordingly, European governments have 
banned or placed restrictions on wearing the burqa in public spaces. 
Likewise, American governments have claimed the right to demand 
that women remove their burqas and other veils, but only in selected 
public spaces. In response to these (allegedly) protective actions, this 
section will examine (a) different perceptions of the burqa within the 
community at the national level; (b) potential intentions of the Muslim 
full-face veil wearers; (c) burqa-wearing interventions by 
governmental agencies; and (d) a brief summary of existing rulings on 
the practice by the courts. One of the outcomes of this examination is 
to determine whether the interpretations of protections of individual 
rights for burqa-wearers as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
(USSC) are better than the interpretations of individual rights as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
 
The Burqa: Different Stakeholder Perceptions 
 Although the American public may not be ready to ban the burqa,2 
certain other stakeholders are ready for such a restrictive measure for 
various reasons. For example, Jason Spencer, a Republican state 
lawmaker in Georgia first introduced, in 2017, and then withdrew an 
amendment to an existing anti-masking law, that would have banned 
Muslim women from wearing full-face veils in public. He claimed 
                                                                                                                   
and which has elected representatives and a chief executive (a president) who are 
responsible to them and who govern according to the law. Its e pluribus unum assumption 
entails multi-ethnicity. In turn, the so-called “melting pot” phenomenon or, as it is now 
referred to, the “(patchwork) quilt”, generates a commitment to respect different races and 
different religions. See Itabari Njeri, Beyond the Melting Pot, Los Angeles Times, 13 
January1991, available at <http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/vw-1_1_melting-
pot>. 
1. U.S. Constitution, supra note 15 [author’s emphasis]. 
2. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, Widespread Support for Banning Full 
Islamic Veil in Western Europe: Most American Disapprove, 2010 [hereinafter Pew 
Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project], available at  
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/08/widespread-support-for-banning-full-islamic-veil-
in-western-europe> (for “Sixty-five percent of Americans say they would oppose a burqa 
ban”). Note that a similar project has not been published since 2010. 
 
 International Studies Journal (ISJ) / N
o.57 / 165 
that although the bill would have “withstood legal scrutiny, it would 
not have withstood political scrutiny”.1 
His amendment was introduced within the context of President 
Donald J. Trump’s campaign promises to restrict Muslims from 
entering the United States.2 Furthermore, a divided Supreme Court (5-
4) upheld the President’s actualized immigration travel ban against 
persons originating from predominantly Muslim countries as a 
legitimate exercise of executive branch authority.3 In an openly non-
neutral response, USSC Justice Sotomayor dissented orally (and 
indeed rarely) in court for about 20 minutes. Extensively quoting 
Trump's promises during and after the 2016 campaign, she also 
submitted the following opinion: 
  
                                                 
1. Lindsey Bever, After outcry, Georgia lawmaker abandons bill that would have banned 
Muslims from wearing veils, The Washington Post, 8 November 2016, available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/11/18/after-outcry-georgia-
lawmaker-abandons-bill-that-would-have-banned-muslims-from-wearing-
veils/?utm_term=.88d1eed6bb2f>. 
The current law in Georgia reads: “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he wears a 
mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered 
as to conceal the identity of the wearer and is upon any public way or public property or 
upon the private property of another without the written permission of the owner or 
occupier of the property to do so”. The proposed amendment would have added the word 
“she” and various exceptions.  
Historically, “Most anti-mask laws were passed… in response to the Ku Klux Klan, whose 
members used masks to hide their identities as they terrorized their victims… Some 15 [of 
50 states] states have anti-masks laws… Supporters of such laws argue that wearing masks 
embolden people to commit crimes and makes those crimes more frightening to the 
victims. Opponents argue that (a) anti-masking laws impair freedom of association; (b) 
masks constitute symbolic speech; and (c) anti-masking laws violate the equal-protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they make exceptions for Halloween masks, 
masquerade ball masks, and masks worn for medical reasons, but not masks for political 
acts”. See Robert A Kahn, Anti-mask Laws, The First Amendment Encyclopedia, available 
at <https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1169/anti-mask-laws>. 
2.  Until we are able to determine and understand this problem (the hatred) and the 
dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks 
by people that believe in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human 
life. See Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim travel to U.S., CNN, 8 
December 2015, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-
trump-muslim-ban-immigration/index.html>. 
3. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court upholds President Trump’s travel ban against majority-
Muslim countries, USA Today, 26 June 2018 available at  
<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/26/supreme-court-upholds-
president-trump-immigration-travel-ban/701110002>; USSC, Trump v. Hawaii 585 U.S. _ 
(2018). 
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[W]hat began as a policy explicitly calling for a total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States 
has since morphed into a 'proclamation' putatively based on 
national-security concerns… But this new window dressing 
cannot conceal an unassailable fact: the words of the 
president and his advisers create the strong perception that 
the proclamation is contaminated by impermissible 
discriminatory animus against Islam and its followers.1 
 
In response to these political and judicial developments, the 
American public recognizes the complexity of the face veil issue, 
including its wide range of different symbolisms – from sectarian to 
secular, from victim to victimizer, from fashion to fanaticism. Some 
viewpoints are held tenaciously; others are not. Today, observers and 
commentators may advocate humanism and heterogeneity; tomorrow, 
they may advocate cultural uniformity. Certainly, together with a 
media context of negative imagery and reported attacks by extremist 
Muslims, the restrictive actions of the President and the authorizing 
rulings of the Supreme Court appear to have contributed to varying 
American levels of intolerance for Muslim garb in general and for the 
burqa in particular. Based on a sizable minority (35 percent) of the 
American population in favor of a (complete) burqa ban,2 at least four 
underlying reasons can be hypothesized: 
1. The burqa is perceived as a religious symbol divisive to American 
unity. 
2. The burqa is assumed to be a political and threatening symbol (cf. 
political Islam). 
3. The burqa is opposed as an item of personal choice.  
4. The burqa is regarded as a cause of safety concerns (cf. criminal 
justice safeguards). 
Interestingly enough, the burqa as a subcultural phenomenon 
presents itself as an analogy to the hoodie in America. What is more, 
it seems to have suffered the same fate as this article of clothing. More 
precisely, a transition from a more neutral to a judgmental response 
has occurred, one that can be explained in the following way: 
                                                 
1. Ibidem. 
2. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, supra note 17. 
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Before the [Trayvon Martin] incident (2012), there was 
a cultural understanding that the African-American 
male wore hoodies as a way to be under the radar, to be 
ambiguous, but not because of any malicious intent, not 
because he was up to no good. Because of the 
pervasive and trenchant racial stereotypes associated 
with black young people, especially males, their styles 
are often singled out for criticism, as signs of 
criminality and misdeeds.1 
Trayvon Martin was killed by a civilian neighborhood watcher, 
who inferred a suspicion merely because of the hoodie he was 
wearing. Imani Perry of Princeton University’s Center for African 
American Studies clarified the hidden premise thusly: 
But in truth this is simply another form of stigmatization 
against the person underneath the clothing, and only 
superficially has anything to do with the clothing.2   
 
If negative perceptions of the burqa and their wearers are 
interpreted as threatening (by analogy to African-American males), 
the victims of the unfounded (and, eo ipso, unfair) perceptions also are 
at risk of becoming the victims of media headlines like the one 
reported in 2018, “Muslim Women Wearing Hijabs Assaulted Just 
Hours After Trump Win”.3 
Similarly, after the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York, the Islamic face veil became the target of verbal 
abuse and criticism. In this instance, however, the victimization of the 
innocent was preceded by actual crimes perpetrated by others, i.e., fellow 
Muslims. 
 
The Question of Intentions: The Muslim Veil Wearers 
Assuming the correctness of the rationale for public viewpoints (cf. 
                                                 
1. Emanuella Grinberg, Hoodie’s evolution from fashion mainstay to symbol of injustice, 
CNN, 27 March 2012, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/living/history-
hoodie-trayvon-martin/index.html>. 
2. Ibidem. 
3. Amanda Sakuma, Muslim Women Wearing Hijabs Assaulted Just Hours After Trump Win, 
NBC News, 10 November 2016, available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-
election/muslim-women-wearing-hijabs-assaulted-just-hours-after-trump-win-n681936>. 
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1-4 in the previous paragraph), the question is how these viewpoints 
relate to the intentions of the Muslim veil wearers, if at all.  
When viewpoints of the non-wearing public do not correspond to 
the intentions of the wearers, the government, representing burqa-
wearers and non-wearers, must attend impartially to the needs of both 
groups. Despite the shifting waves of public opinion, the religious 
rights of women, as persons, are anchored in the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution (whereby “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof”). With certain exceptions (Davis v. Beason (1890)), the 
tendency is to allow the free exercise and expressions of religions.1 
However, one might ask whether intentions of the female wearers or 
the perceived symbolism of burqa-wearing matter to the USSC?  
To begin to answer, a woman’s choice of veil (partial versus full-
face and -body) depends upon her religious interpretation of a 
modesty provision.2 Because “Islamic garments may be religious, 
political, or personal signifiers”, the choice to wear a certain type of 
veil can be motivated by any combination of those three reasons.  
Distinct from religious intentions, some burqa-wearers may choose 
to wear it as a symbol of political Islam. Correspondingly, some non-
wearers may embrace and view it as part of a trend of expressing 
one’s political outlook. They have seen feminists, racial supremacists, 
3 social justice advocates – protestors of all sorts – wear clothing that 
                                                 
1.  Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. [Author’s emphasis].  
See USSC, Raynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), available at 
<http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance2>; USSC, Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333 (1890), available at <https://www.supremecourt.gov>. 
2. Some Muslim women interpret their duty to be modest as the duty to “draw their veils” 
over their hair only and not over their hands or eyes; and thus, these women would dress 
modestly by wearing headscarves. Other Muslim women include their face, their hands, 
and their eyes as part of their beauty. These women wear burqas to cover these parts as 
well. Yet other Muslim women read no obligation to wear religious garb into the 24:31 
provision of the Quran. They argue that the absence of a mandate means that women are 
free to choose for themselves. Muslim scholars have offered equally divergent views 
regarding the meaning of “modesty”. The interpretation of the provision is “relative to the 
culture in which Muslims find themselves”. See Shaira Nanwani, The Burqa Ban: An 
Unreasonable Limitation on Religious Freedom or a Justifiable Restriction? 25 EMORY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1431 (2011), available at <http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-
25/issue-3/comments/burqa-ban-limitation-religious-freedom-restriction.html>. 
3. Supra note 18 (for the Ku Klux Klan as an example). 
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express conformity, on one hand, and rebellion on the other. E.g., they 
have seen celebrities wear black at the 75th Golden Globe Award 
ceremony. Accordingly, various Americans may view the wearing of 
the veil as an expression that blocks harmony or as a symbol of gender 
inequality and female oppression, or as an expression of extremism 
and fanaticism.  
Regardless of the varying viewpoints of the American public, the 
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment protection goes beyond 
“pure speech” – books, newspapers, leaflets, and rallies. It also 
protects “symbolic speech” – nonverbal expression the purpose of 
which is to communicate ideas. In its 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des 
Moines, the USSC recognized the right of public school students to 
wear black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. In 1969, 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court established a new standard, viz., 
that speech can be suppressed on condition that it is intended, and 
likely to produce, “imminent lawless action”.1 Otherwise, even speech 
that advocates violence is protected. The Brandenburg standard 
prevails today. In summary, whether the burqa-wearer expresses a 
political viewpoint, makes some Americans feel uncomfortable, 
expresses extremism, or advocates violence; if and only if its wearing 
is intended and likely to produce imminent lawless action, can it be 
restricted legally by the government. 
Apart from the burqa’s multiple symbolisms (to others) and apart 
from any religious or political intentions, if the wearer chooses to 
wear it freely, then it expresses a purely personal choice or taste. Yet, 
there is no evidence that the American government has assessed how 
many women wear the burqa because of external pressure versus 
personal choice. In this regard, Amnesty International submitted a 
statement to the 55th Session of the United Nations Commission on the 
Status of Women: 
Under international human rights law everyone has the 
rights to freedom of expression... The way people dress 
can be an important expression of their… personal 
identity or beliefs. Governments have an obligation to 
respect, protect and ensure every individual’s right to 
                                                 
1. USSC, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) [hereinafter Brandenburg v. Ohio], 
available at <https://www.supremecourt.gov>. 
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express their beliefs or personal convictions or identity. 
They must create an environment in which every 
person can make that choice free of coercion.1 
The Supreme Court has made clear the weight that it gives to 
international law: 
 
It is agreed that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights [UDHR] was not viewed as imposing legal 
obligations on states at the time of its adoption by the 
General Assembly in 1948.2  
 
Furthermore, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the USSC also 
stated:  
Several times, indeed, the Senate has expressly 
declined to give the federal courts the task of 
interpreting and applying international human rights 
law, as when its ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the 
substantive provisions of the document were not self-
executing... These reasons argue for great caution in 
adapting the law of nations to private rights… And, 
although the Covenant does bind the United States as a 
matter of international law, the United States ratified 
the Covenant on the express understanding that it was 
not self-executing and so did not itself create 
obligations enforceable in the federal courts.3 
Generally, under national law, whether a person wears Islamic 
garments for religious or political reasons, she is protected by the First 
                                                 
1. Amnesty International, Women’s right to choose their dress, free of coercion, 2011, 
available at 
<https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2017/02/womens_right_to_dress_boerkaverbod_
3.pdf?x17739>. 
2. Hurst Hannum The UDHR in National and International Law, 3/2 HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 145, 147 (2014), available at <https://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2014/04/16-Hannum.pdf>. 
Hannum adds: “The vast majority of the world’s population has no direct domestic or 
international redress for violations of human rights recognized under international 
conventions”. See id., at 153. 
3. USSC, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), available at  
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>. 
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Amendment to the Constitution or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.1 However, Title VII requires employers to accommodate2 only 
those religious beliefs that are “sincerely held”. If the wearing of the 
veil is due to pure choice or convenience, although Article 19 of the 
UDHR would protect it, the American Constitutional protections may 
or may not be applicable in non-school or non-private corporate 
settings.3 The Supreme Court has made numerous rulings in school 
and business settings. For example, considering the potential impact 
of religious garbs in school settings, during the early 1900s, most of 
the American states had emphasized that the wearing of the headscarf 
in public schools had the potential to influence young minds 
                                                 
1. Therefore, whether or not a religious belief is “sincerely held” by an applicant or employee 
is only relevant to religious accommodation, not to claims of disparate treatment or 
harassment because of religion. In those claims, it is the motivation of the discriminating 
official, not the actual beliefs of the individual alleging discrimination, that are typically 
relevant in determining if the discrimination that occurred was because of religion. In 
general, employers are required by federal law to make exceptions to their usual rules or 
preferences to permit applicants and employees to observe religious dress and grooming 
practices. See U.S. EEOC, Compliance Manual, Section 12: Religious Discrimination, 22 
July 2008, available at  
<https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html#_Toc203359488>; Religious Garb and 
Grooming in the Workplace; Rights and Responsibilities [hereinafter Rights and 
Responsibilities], available at  
<https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm>. 
2. To clarify the meaning of accommodation, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has posted the following on its website:  
A private company may adopt a policy barring any headgear... the employer 
should consider requests to wear religious headgear on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether the identified risks exist in that situation and pose an undue 
hardship. Relevant facts may include the individual's job, the garb at issue, and 
the available accommodations. For example, if an individual's religious headgear 
is or can be worn in a manner that does not inhibit visual identification of the 
employee, and if temporary removal may be accomplished for security 
screen[ings] and to address smuggling concerns without undue hardship, the 
individual can be accommodated. 
See U.S. EEOC, Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 33, at  
<https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm>. 
3. Sample speech limitations include no yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater, see USSC, 
Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), available at  
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>; no “fighting words”, cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568 (1942), USSC, ibidem; no “obscene and appeal to a prurient interest”, cf. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), USSC, ibidem. 
In addition, there are numerous nudity, decency and school-setting restrictions on the right 
to wear clothing.  
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considerably.1 However currently, only three of the fifty states still 
ban teachers’ religious clothing: Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska. 
To explain more of the complexity of the Court’s interpretative 
process, the distinction between so-called strict and loose 
constructionists play an important role. In terms of constitutional 
interpretation, strict constructionists base their approach on the text 
alone and, therefore, if a right is not written in the Constitution, then it 
does not exist. Loose constructionists, on the other hand, holds that 
legal interpretation requires applying knowledge from outside the 
Constitution's text, such as history, scientific findings, and political 
circumstances. In this vein, they appeal to the Ninth Amendment, 
which reads:  
 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people. 
 
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), the Court stated, in accordance 
with loose constructionism:  
 
Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a 
general right to privacy, the various guarantees within 
the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that 
establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, 
Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new 
constitutional right, the right to privacy in marriage…2 
Based on Griswold, it can be argued that under the Ninth, Fourth, 
                                                 
1. Virgil C. Blum, Religious Liberty and the Religious Garb 22 U. CHIC. L. REV. 875 
(1995), available at 
<https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2885&context=uclrev>
; Caitlin S. Kerr, Teachers’ Religious Garb as an Instrument for Globalization in 
Education, 18/1 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 539 (2011) available at 
<https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1453&context=ijgls> 
Note that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1894) rejected the contention that the 
wearing of religious dress in public schools was equivalent to sectarian teaching, and that 
North Dakota (1936) and Indiana (1940) followed suit as opposed to states which denied 
teachers the right to wear religious garb, inter alia, Missouri (1953), New York (1906), 
Iowa (1918), New Mexico (1951), Oregon (1923), and Nebraska (1919). 
2. USSC, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), available at  
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>. 
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and First Amendment, another aspect of a privacy right could be 
established. Invoking ethics, additional individual rights may be 
substantiated and supported, alongside those specifically mentioned in 
the first eight Constitutional amendments, which should be protected 
against interference;1 namely, that females (should) have the right to 
wear the burqa based on a freedom of privacy and of personal 
expression. As a result, the wearer would be “secure in her person” 
and be able to express her personal conviction freely. She would be 
protected against any unwarranted interference. If the burqa becomes 
a true threat, the government will have to defend against it and ban its 
wearing. The balancing of the reasons of any proposed government 
ban versus the reasons of the individual wearer will be determined by 
the lower courts initially and finally by the USSC.  
Many Americans may perceive full-face veils as a threat to safety. 
Even so, in Virginia v. Black (2003), the Supreme Court distinguished 
between “threats” and “true threats”:2 
 
The First Amendment permits a State to ban “true 
threats”… which encompass those statements where 
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression 
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to an 
individual or group or individuals… The speaker need 
not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a 
prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the 
fear of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, 
as well as from the possibility that the threatened 
violence will occur.3 
 
According to this ruling, unless the wearer intends to harm an 
individual or group or to terrorize them, the mere wearing of a veil 
will not run afoul of the First Amendment. Even if Americans see the 
burqa as a threat, it may or may not constitute a “true threat”, which 
would be prohibited.  
                                                 
1. Anja Matwijkiw & Willie Mack, Making Sense of the Right to Truth in Educational Ethics: 
Toward a Theory and Practice that Protect the Fundamental Interests of Adolescent 
Students, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 355 (2007). 
2. USSC, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) [hereinafter Virginia v. Black], available at 
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/case.html>. 
3. Ibidem. 
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Courts have restricted obscenity and threats against a person’s life 
or body. They have reasoned that morality and social order outweigh 
unbridled free expression. On issues pertaining to locations outside of 
schools or of work, it is not known where courts would draw the line 
that bans Muslim garbs worn for purely personal reasons. For 
example, if contested, it is not known whether the Court would favor 
“social harmony” over any “right to privacy”.  
 
Interventions to Burqa-Wearing by Governmental Agencies 
The different impact of different intentions has not been clearly 
delineated by the USSC, as shown in the previous paragraph. 
However, various real-world cases illustrate that when 
governments do not accommodate in reasonable ways, a negative 
impact for all stakeholders can be observed, even for wearing a veil or 
scarf that does not qualify as a full-face covering (burqa). 
For example, a Muslim woman whose religious practice required 
that she cover her head in public sued the Orange County Sheriff's 
Department in California, alleging that her rights were violated when 
jail officials forced her to remove her headscarf while locked up for 
about eight hours. The woman in question, Ms. Souhair Khatib, 
claimed “extreme mental and emotional distress”. Although not all 
Muslims interpret the Quran as mandating the practice, she maintained 
that headscarves, more precisely, a hijab, must be worn in public. 
Crying, she had managed to convince the deputies to allow her to 
wear it until she passed the men’s cells. In the jail cell, she had 
removed her headscarf, but replaced it with a vest she had been 
wearing. She was ordered to take the vest off her head. Experiencing 
“severe discomfort”, “distress”, and “humiliation”, Ms. Khatib 
attempted to cover herself by pulling her knees into her chest, as a last 
resort. She remained in the jail for processing without her hijab and in 
full view of male inmates and deputies. Despite repeated requests, she 
was not allowed to wear her hijab until she was released from the 
building.1 As a result, a total of $85,000 in damages and assorted costs 
                                                 
1. Anita L. Allen, Veiled Women in the American Courtroom: Is the Nijab a Barrier to 
Justice?, in THE RULE OF LAW AND THE RULE OF GOD (Simeon O. Ilesanmi et al, eds., 
2014), available at <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1618>; 9th Cir., 
Souhair Khatib v. County of Orange, No. 08-56423 (2010) [hereinafter Souhair Khatib v.  
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were awarded to Ms. Khatib and the law enforcement officers were 
ordered to undergo relevant training. 
Another example is that of an incident in which the city of Long 
Beach, California, had agreed to pay $85,000 to settle a federal 
lawsuit filed by a Muslim woman whose hijab was pulled off by a 
male officer while she was in police custody. She had been detained 
twenty-four hours without her hijab. She cried throughout the entire 
ordeal and experienced humiliation when she felt that her religious 
beliefs and personal integrity had been violated.1  
Together, these two examples suffice to demonstrate that when 
governments thwart religious intentions and violate religious 
expressions pertaining to headscarfs, this can have serious legal and 
financial consequences in the U.S. 
In contrast to the protection of personal rights of individuals (i.e., 
veil wearers), the government also protects the public (i.e., veil 
wearers and non-wearers), cf. Davis v. Beason (1890).2 Whether the 
federal or any state government has a right to demand that women 
remove their veils, including their burqas, in all public spaces is a 
debated issue. Despite that, the government has already decided that in 
courtroom situations, based on security issues, parole violators can be 
required to remove head coverings.3 A California court overturned the 
                                                                                                                   
 County of Orange], available at  
<http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/15/08-56423.pdf>; Gabriel San 
Roman, Local Muslim Woman Wins Hijab Settlement With OC Sheriff’s Department, 14 
February 2013, available at <https://www.ocweekly.com/local-muslim-woman-wins-hijab-
settlement-with-oc-sheriffs-department-6455336>. 
1. Veronica Rocha, Muslim woman awarded $85,000 after her hijab was forcibly removed by 
Long Beach police officer, Los Angeles Times, 10 August 2017, available at 
<http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-muslim-woman-hijab-removed-settlement-
20170810-story.html>. 
2.It was never intended that the First Article of Amendment to the Constitution, that 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof,’ should be a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts 
inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society... 
See USSC, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), available at  
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/case.html>. 
3. Souhair Khatib v. County of Orange, supra note 41; Allen, supra note 41. 
Note that the Supreme Court of Michigan has adopted a rule that provides: “The court shall 
exercise reasonable control over the appearance of parties and witnesses so as to (1) ensure 
that the demeanor of such persons may be observed and assessed by the fact-finder, and (2) 
to ensure the accurate identification of such person…” See Evidence ProfBlogger, What 
Not to Wear, Religious Edition: Supreme Court of Michigan Adopts Rule Allowing 
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government practice; while the Michigan Supreme Court upheld it. 
However, while in police custody with reasonable accommodations, 
Muslim women may be allowed to wear their headscarves.1 In 
general, depending on which state a headscarf-wearer is located, she 
may face dissimilar legal consequences. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In the main, government can limit protected speech by imposing 
“time, place and manner” restrictions. It cannot punish speech 
(symbolic or expressive) that advocates violence or violation of the 
law unless that speech (a) is directed at inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and (b) is likely to produce such action. The 
USSC reasoned that mere advocacy (protected speech) differs from 
inciting people to commit violence immediately (not-protected 
speech).2 In addition, the government cannot punish offensive 
expression utilized to excite individuals and which is committed as an 
act of political expression (protected speech), but it can prohibit 
speech that is intended to intimidate (not-protected speech).3 Because 
the Supreme Court has not ruled on burqa bans, the current legal 
consequences for wearers may be inconsistent.  
 
Irrespective of this, some legal experts conclude that: 
 
A law, like the one adopted in France, banning the 
hijab for students in schools would most likely be 
considered unconstitutional in the United States.4  
 
The conclusion, so it should be emphasized, can also be extended 
to the new Danish law, namely, law L 219 whereby full-face veils like 
                                                                                                                   
Judges to Exercise “Reasonable Control over the appearance of Parties and Witnesses” 
Based on Niqab Case, 18 June 2009, available at  
<http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2009/06/michigan-
611httpwwwgooglecomhostednewsaparticlealeqm5gljakuaz1okb1ordgalldjo93luwd98sm7
a81httpcourtsmichigangov.html>. 
1. San Roman, supra note 41. 
2. Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra note 29. 
3. Virginia v. Black, supra note 39. 
4. Jennifer M. Westerfield, Behind the Veil: An American Legal Perspective on the European 
Headscarf Debate, 54 AM. J. COMP. L, 637, 661-62 (2006). 
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the burqa and the niqab are now banned. As long as the Supreme 
Court adheres to a loose constructionist interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution, thereby accommodating the political circumstances, it is 
more likely than not that a ban will not be upheld. 
The precarious nature of this state of affairs is, of course, obvious. 
This is particularly true in the light of the fact that whereas religious 
and political reasons for veil-wearing are protected by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, these same protections may be jeopardized by, inter alia, 
an employer who questions the sincerity of the employee’s religious 
belief or practice, in effect, for his/her own personal reasons. If so, 
rights-violations are likely to occur. Furthermore, the scope of 
protection for personal reasons has not yet been determined by the 
Court, and the absence of defined limits cannot but make “rights” to 
burqa-wearing precarious. Although the Ninth Amendment of the 
Constitution arguably protects personal choices of privacy and, with 
this, veil choices, legal outcomes may or may not support rights. – 
Nothing can be more precarious than that.  
However, burqa-wearers still have more protections in America 
than in Europe where the ECtHR is downplaying those norms of the 
European Convention of Human Rights that Muslim women depend 
upon – to protect interests that amount to perceived threats on behalf 
of the government.  
Yet, this conclusion in no way overlooks President Trump’s recent 
immigration travel ban against persons originating from 
predominantly Muslim countries. His so-called America First policy is 
as protectionist as Europe’s restrictive policies. As a result, banning 
people from war-related zones indicates a lack of respect for refugees 
and human rights law. Even so, echoing the Tinker case,1 foreigners 
do not shed their inalienable human dignity or freedom of expression 
at the nation’s border.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1. USSC, Tinker v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503 (1969), available at 
   <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/343/case.html>. 
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IV Dr. Erik Baldwin: 
A Critique of the Reasoning in Favor of a General Ban on Muslim 
Women from Wearing the Burqa 
Introduction 
In this section, I consider existent legal justification in support of 
the ban on Muslim women from wearing the burqa. Focusing on legal 
cases in the European Union (EU) and the United States, I argue that it 
is sometimes permissible to restrict freedom of speech and religious 
liberty. Granting that the burqa ban may be in principle justifiable, I 
argue that the actual line of reasoning provided by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) is too strong and subject to 
counterexamples. Wearing the burqa is not necessarily contrary to the 
values of “living together”. Moreover, even if it is, because pluralistic 
democracies value liberty, Muslim women should be free to wear the 
burqa. If Muslim women are banned from wearing the burqa because 
doing so is fundamentally contrary to “living together”, then, so I 
argue, it follows that the government should act to coerce people with 
so-called “anti-social” tendencies to fraternize with others or face 
punishment or sanctions. Since the latter policy is clearly absurd, 
Muslim woman should be free to wear the burqa in public. 
 
Argument 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) recognizes the 
right to respect for private and family life. Under Article 8, it holds that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The ECHR also recognizes, cf. Article 9, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion: 
 
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1. [T]his right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.1 
 
Muslim women consider wearing the hijab to be fundamental to 
their religious practice and to their identity. Rajnaara Akhtar writes: 
 
The Hijab is more than a piece of cloth that covers the 
hair, neck and chest of a woman, it is an act of worship 
in response to the Qur’anic commandant that a woman 
should cover herself in this way so that she can be 
recognized as a Muslim woman and be protected as 
such.2  
 
“For Muslim women”, so Akhtar concludes, wearing the Hijab, is 
an act of worship”.3 This line of reasoning would apply equally to 
wearing the burqa. 
Similarly, Rabiha Hannan reports that most Muslim women in 
Britain choose to cover up as an act of worship. Most of the Muslim 
women questioned in a focus group study, 
 
… felt their style of dress was overwhelmingly based 
on what they believed God had asked of them. For 
many it was… an increased religiosity and spiritual 
awareness … that triggered a desire to practice Islam 
more meticulously and let to them covering themselves 
… Their understanding of the dress requirements was 
                                                 
1. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, available at  
< https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf>. 
 2. SAIED R. AMELI & ARZU MERALI, HIJAB, MEANING, IDENTITY, OTHERIZATION AND  
     POLITICS: BRITISH MUSLIM WOMEN 64 (2006). 
3. Ibidem. 
 
 International Studies Journal (ISJ) / N
o.57 / 180 
clearly based on what they believed to be Islamic 
directives in the Qur’an.1 
 
She also reports what women choose to cover up for protection 
from unwanted sexual advances and as a way of asserting their 
Muslim identity.2 
Given that wearing the hijab and the burqa are recognized as acts 
of worship by Muslims, it would seem that Articles 8 and 9 of the 
ECHR rather straightforwardly suggest that Muslim women would be 
free to wear them in private and in public. At first glance, it is difficult 
to see how it could be that wearing the hijab and the burqa could be 
necessary to secure the interests of public safety, the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. However, in several cases, including S.A.S. v. 
France (2014), Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (2017), and Dakir v. 
Belgium (2017), the ECtHR ruled that banning women from wearing 
full-face veils, such as the niqab and the burqa, was legal. Briefly, 
while the ECtHR recognized that Muslim women have a general right 
to practice their religion, it upheld the full-face veil ban on grounds 
that doing so is “necessary in a democratic society” in order to protect 
“the rights and freedoms of others” and to guarantee the conditions of 
“living together”.3  
Specifically, while recognizing that Article 9 on religious freedom 
implies that Muslim women are free to manifest their religion in 
public, including worship practices, the ECtHR concluded that Article 
9 does not “always guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere 
in a manner which is dictated by one’s religious beliefs”.4 The ECtHR 
argued that given the pluralistic nature of a democratic society, “it 
may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to manifest one’s 
                                                 
1. Rabiha Hannan, An Exploration of the Debates Pertaining to Head Covering and Face 
Veiling of Women in the British Muslim Context, in ISLAM AND THE VEIL: THEORETICAL AND 
REGIONAL CONTEXTS 91 (Theodore Gabriel & Rabiha Hannan eds., 2011). 
2. Id., at 92-94. 
3. James Crisp, Belgian ban on Muslim full-face veil is legal, European Court of Human 
Rights rules, The Telegraph, 11 July 2017, available at  
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/11/belgian-ban-full-face-veil-legal-european-
court-human-rights>. 
4. ECtHR, Case of S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 1 
July 2014, para. 125. 
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religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected”.1  
Before getting into the details of the ECtHR’s line of reasoning and 
considering its merits, it would be helpful to, first, consider a few less 
controversial cases in order to see how certain limitations on rights 
could be legally justifiable and appropriate.  
Various courts have ruled that freedom of expression is not absolute 
or without limitation. For example, following the legal opinion of United 
Stated Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes on Schenck v. 
United States (1919), certain limitations on the First Amendment right of 
free speech have been recognized as appropriate. The First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution reads: 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.2 
 
In his opinion on Schenck v. United States (1919), Justice Holmes 
argued that even, “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would 
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic”.3 Because falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater creates “a 
clear and present danger”, the Supreme Court ruled that laws to curb and 
prevent such speech are not in conflict with the First Amendment but are 
appropriate on account of the “clear and present danger” and obvious 
harms that such unfettered speech would bring about.4 
Along similar lines, many countries in the EU have laws against 
hateful, libelous, and defamatory speech. For instance, Article 10 of 
the ECHR reads: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
                                                 
1. Id., at para. 126. 
2. National Archives, The Constitution of the United States, available at  
<https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript> (for Amendment 1). 
3. USSC, Schenck v. United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919), available at  
<https://www.supremecourt.gov>. 
4. Ibidem. 
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include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority 
and impartiality of the judiciary. 
For the reasons listed in Article 10 section 2 of the ECHR, “hate 
speech” has been outlawed in many parts of the EU.1 For example, 
Article 4(a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) requires all signatories to 
“declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based 
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as 
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race 
or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin”.2 And Article 
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) states, “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall 
be prohibited by law”.3  
While hate speech laws have not gone unchallenged, it is not hard 
to see how placing some limitations on freedom of expression and 
speech would be justified for the sake of the public good. Thus, 
reflection on The Crowded Theater Case goes to show that the right of 
freedom of expression is not absolute but subject to legal regulation. 
                                                 
1. See Council of Europe, Media, Defamation and Freedom of Expression: A Study of the 
case law of the ECHR, 2016, available at <https://book.coe.int/eur/en/human-rights-and-
democracy/7072-freedom-of-expression-and-defamation.html>. 
2. U.N. General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, GA Res. 2106 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965), art. 4(a), available at  
< https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cerd.aspx>. 
3. U.N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 
2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), art. 20. 
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Reflection on other cases suggests that the right to practice one’s 
faith is not absolute either. Consider a case in which a 14-year-old boy 
is in dire need of a blood transfusion. The child wants to get the 
transfusion. His parents, being Jehovah’s Witnesses, are opposed to 
the practice for religious reasons and prevent him from receiving one.1 
Arguably, the boy’s parents have a right to make decisions for the 
well-being of their children regarding matters of faith and practice, 
and it is generally recognized that parents have the right to raise their 
children in accord with their own religious beliefs and commitments, 
and freedom to practice religion is among those goods that contribute 
to overall well-being. 
Regarding this sort of case, Mark Sheldon has argued the 
following: Given that the child and his parents disagree about what is 
ultimately in the child’s best interests, and given that the state is not in 
a position to adjudicate the veracity of the parent’s claim that 
abstaining from blood transfusions is in the child’s best interests, the 
state’s responsibility is to ensure that people who make decisions 
about such matters are competent.2 He notes that people generally 
accept that parents know what is in the best interests of their children. 
Because of the significance of the family as a moral institution, its 
integrity should be maintained and, therefore, the state should be 
cautious about interfering.3 On the other hand, Sheldon notes that what 
is fundamentally at issue here is whether the child is both sufficiently 
mature and competent to make his own decisions. Specifically, even 
though the boy is still a minor, it very well may be the case that he is 
both sufficiently mature and competent to have his own conception of 
what is conducive to his overall well-being. As such, he would seem 
to have the right to disagree with his parents about the specific nature 
of the good for him, particularly when the perceived religious good of 
                                                 
1. Jehovah’s Witnesses don’t accept blood transfusions for religious reasons. The Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania provide the following justification for their 
view: Both the Old and New Testaments clearly command us to abstain from blood. 
(Genesis 9:4; Leviticus 17:10; Deuteronomy 12:23; Acts 15:28, 29) Also, God views blood 
as representing life. (Leviticus 17:14) So we avoid taking blood not only in obedience to 
God but also out of respect for him as the Giver of life. 
See <https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-
transfusions>. 
2. Mark Sheldon, Ethical issues in the forced transfusion of Jehovah’s Witness children, 14(2) 
JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE 251, 256-257 (1996). 
3. Id. at 256. 
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complying with the prohibition on receiving blood transfusions 
conflicts with the well-documented health benefits of receiving blood 
transfusions. He might assert that he is an autonomous moral agent 
and as such has the moral right to receive the blood transfusion and 
thus choose against his religious good as it is perceived by his 
parents.1 This line of reasoning assumes that using ethics as a criterion 
for lawfulness is appropriate at the national and international level.2 
For these reasons, might a court be morally justified to rule in favor of 
the boy, effectively overruling and outweighing the legitimate but 
non-absolute right of parents to make choices about the spiritual 
wellbeing of their children?  
Reflection on The Crowded Theater and The Contested Blood 
Transfusion cases suggests that perhaps a ban on full-face veils in 
public places may be morally permissible for considerations having to 
do with substantive justice (cf. harm or autonomy). At the very least, 
reflection on these cases goes to show that the moral and/or legal right 
that Muslim women have to worship in public by wearing the burqa is 
not absolute and as such is subject to regulation and may even be 
overruled. Note that laws against yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater 
don’t place general limitations on freedom of expression. Similarly, 
one might argue that while the law prohibits them from wearing the 
burqa, Muslim women are still allowed to manifest their religious 
beliefs by engaging in various practices and observances in public. 
For instance, there is no general ban against eating halal meat or 
congregating at the local mosque on Fridays. 
However, is banning Muslim women from wearing full-face veils 
actually justifiable for the reasons cited by the ECtHR? Recall that the 
ECtHR argued that the full-face veil ban is “necessary” in order to 
protect “the rights and freedoms of others” so as to guarantee the 
conditions of “living together”. Recall the justification given: “[I]t 
may be necessary to place limitations on freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected”. Essentially, 
                                                 
1. See generally id. 
2. For a defense of this view, see Anja Matwijkiw & Bronik Matwijkiw, The Unapologetic 
Integration of Ethics: Stakeholder Realignments in the light of Global Law and Shared 
Governance Doctrine. – Distilling the Essence of Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo's 
Jurisprudential Paradigm-Shift,15 GLOBAL COMMUNITY YILJ 885 (2016). 
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this justification amounts to the claim that since many people living in 
Denmark and the EU are not Muslims, having various other religious 
beliefs, or indeed no religious beliefs at all, for Muslim women should 
wear the burqa in public would be contrary to many of these people’s 
interests and beliefs. One underlying assumption appears to be that the 
fact that non-Muslims may or will be made uncomfortable or offended 
by seeing women wearing the burqa in public is sufficient grounds for 
banning Muslim women from doing so. Notably, the ECtHR has ruled 
that other public demonstrations of faith may be banned on the basis 
of similar lines of reasoning. E.g., Kurtulmuş v. Turkey banned the 
wearing of religious symbols in State schools.  
Essentially agreeing with a 2010 ruling by the French Conseil d’État 
“on the possible legal grounds for banning the full veil”, the ECtHR ruled 
that wearing the burqa is inconsistent with the fundamental requirements 
of “living together”. Citing the fundamental French values of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity, the Conseil d’État argued: 
 
The voluntary and systematic concealment of the face 
is problematic because it is simply incompatible with 
the fundamental requirements of ‘living together’ in 
French Society… The systematic concealment of the 
face in public places, contrary to the ideal of fraternity, 
also falls short of the minimum requirement of civility 
that is necessary for social interaction… Lastly, in the 
case of the full veil [burqa], worn only by women, this 
breach of dignity of the person goes hand in hand with 
the public manifestation of conspicuous denial of 
equality between men and women, through which that 
breach is constituted.1 
  
Summed up, the argument goes like this: The values of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity are essential to “living together” in a pluralistic 
and democratic society. Wearing the burqa is fundamentally 
inconsistent with “living together”. Thus, in order to guarantee the 
conditions of “living together”, banning wearing the burqa is legally 
justifiable. 
                                                 
1. ECtHR, supra note 56, at para. 25. 
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Response – Liberal Democracy at Stake 
Is this line of argument plausible? One problem with this argument 
is that if it is successful, it would seem to require too much. For 
instance, in modern society, it’s possible for one to get on without 
much social interaction. One can shop online, work online, and carry 
on without “living together”. Some people enjoy solitude, or have 
anti-social tendencies, or simply prefer to withdraw from society to 
some degree or other. According to the line of reasoning offered by 
the Conseil d’État and endorsed by the ECtHR, it would seem to 
follow that these “anti-social” activities should be discouraged and 
perhaps even be subject to sanction or punishment. This result is, 
naturally, absurd. People in a liberal democracy should be allowed to 
choose to carry on in life without being forced to “live together” with 
others. Governments should not constrain or coerce “anti-social” 
people to carry on with others, etc. Likewise, it stands to reason that 
even if wearing the burqa is contrary to the value of fraternity, 
governments should be cautious indeed to ban women from wearing 
them by appealing to the value “living together”. On a related note, a 
truly pluralistic society will allow its citizens some measure of leeway 
to unpack their own substantive notions of what liberty, equality, and 
fraternity amount to. Might not there be uniquely Islamic notions of 
the values? And might it be the case that there is a core region of 
agreement between traditional French, Danish, et al, understanding of 
these values? For instance, Muslim women who wear the burqa do so 
not in isolation, but in communities. Isn’t there fraternity, then, 
between Muslims all of whom wear the veil? Must French fraternity 
require that all people wear the same clothes and engage in the same 
kinds of practices? The answer, of course, is no. So why couldn’t 
there be room for Muslims to value fraternity but express it differently 
in a pluralistic society such as France? Is it truly impossible for 
Muslim women who wear the veil to also be French? 
Perhaps the underlying motivation for the ban is that those who 
want to wear the burqa do so because they have non-Western political 
and religious values and attitudes that threaten Western society and 
political institutions in some way. For instance, wearing the burqa in 
public may be seen as indicative of Islamization. Emile Nakhleh 
characterizes Islamization as a process or a sense of growing 
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awareness among Muslims of the dominance of their Muslim identity 
over other identities and the realization of the ways in Islam provides 
Muslims with a comprehensive world view that impacts their daily 
lives and serves as a guide to their social and political activism.1 Some 
see Islamization as a fundamental threat to Western Civilization, and 
it is often associated with jihadism2, which is widely recognized as a 
transnational threat to democratic institutions within the EU.3 
Islamization is also associated with the implementation of sharia 
councils in the United Kingdom, which some see as a threat to the rule 
of law, despite the fact that these councils deal only with divorce and 
family law, finance, and certain business matters, and have no legal 
statues, no legal binding authority under civil law, and no legal 
jurisdiction in England and Wales.4 Islamization, radicalization, and 
violent jihad are all legitimate concerns. The problem, however, is 
whether there is a strong connection between two relatively 
independent kinds of actions: namely, cases in which a woman 
chooses to wear the burqa as an act of worship and cases in which a 
woman chooses to wear the burqa for motives that are in line with 
Islamization, radicalism, or jihadism. Such cases can overlap; for 
instance, a woman might choose to wear the burqa as an act of 
worship and for motives that are in line with Islamization, radicalism, 
or jihadism. But it would be incorrect and unfair to suppose that all 
Muslim women who wear the burqa in public endorse Islamization, 
radicalism, or jihadism. At any rate, one should not fallaciously 
conflate a Danish or French Muslim woman’s exercising her religious 
freedom to worship by wearing the burqa in public with her performing 
an act that that is in line with Islamization, radicalism, and/or jihadism. 
While perhaps, at least in principle, a liberal democracy could be morally 
justified in banning people from engaging in certain religious practices in 
                                                 
1. EMILE NAKHLEH, A NECESSARY ENGAGEMENT: REINVENTING AMERICA’S RELATIONS WITH 
THE MUSLIM WORLD 4 (2008). 
2. E.g., see TONY BLANKLEY, THE WEST’S LAST CHANCE: WILL WE WIN THE CLASH OF 
CIVILIZATIONS? (2006).  
3. See Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, From dawa to jihad: The various 
threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order, March 30, 2005, available at 
<https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-jihad>. 
4. The Home Office, The independent review into the application of sharia law in England 
and Wales, February 2018, at 4, (Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department by Command of Her Majesty), available at  
<www.gov.uk/government/publications>. 
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public spaces, the ECtHR has not in fact shown this to be the case with 
respect to its decision to uphold a general ban on Muslim women from 
wearing the burqa in public.  
 
V. Dr. Ryan Long: 
Religion and the Democratic Public Sphere 
A democratic ideal is that all citizens have equal standing, and show 
each other equal respect, in the public sphere. The public sphere should 
be structured to empower the full, free, and equal participation of all 
citizens.1 Some arguments for the ban rely on an alleged incompatibility 
between full-face veils and full participation in the democratic public 
sphere. These worries come in at least two forms. The first is that being 
covered physically impedes or prevents full, open participation in the 
public sphere. The second is that full-face veils express or symbolize 
something incompatible with democratic values. 
The first form of the argument assumes that seeing each other’s 
faces and bodies is essential to full participation in the public sphere. 
This is then taken as a reason to ban full-face veils. The face is “the 
foundation for recognition”, according to the parliamentary report that 
provided the justification for Danish law L 219.2 Unveiled interaction 
in the public sphere makes it possible to “read signals and feelings”, 
thereby giving rise to a more complete comprehension (in comparison 
to verbal dialogue with a veiled individual).3 
Martha Nussbaum argues against this form of argument by giving 
counterexamples.4 She discusses the ways various professionals 
(dentists, American football players, skiers) cover their faces, and how 
residents of frigid climates often completely cover their faces. She 
argues that none of this precludes the “transparency and reciprocity” 
required for full participation in the public sphere. However, one can 
                                                 
1. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality? 109/2 ETHICS 287-337 (1999). 
2. Ministry of Justice, Forslag (og Bemærkninger) til Lov om Ændring af Straffeloven 
(Tildækningsforbud) [Proposal (and Commentaries) for Amendment of the Penal Law 
(Cover Ban)], 11 April 2018, j.nr. 2017-0090-0233, p. 2, available at 
<http://www.ft.dk/da/search?msf=&q=tild%C3%A6kningsforbud&as=1>. 
3. Id. 
4. Martha Nussbaum, Veiled threats? New York Times, 11 July 2010, available at 
<https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-
threats/?mtrref=www.google.dk&gwh=ACFCEF4712AA5E279E14D6E8C7F59
0D2&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion>. 
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object that these examples are not analogous to the veil. These 
examples are for particular purposes and are only worn for a subset of 
one’s time in the public sphere. The full-face veil can be used to 
demarcate the public and private spheres. If it is always worn in 
public, it seems meaningfully different from her examples. Nussbaum 
is correct that completely covered persons in cold climates interact 
without loss of transparency and reciprocity, and that we can 
meaningfully interact with professionals who have their faces covered. 
The question then becomes whether always having one’s face covered 
in the public sphere poses a problem for transparency and reciprocity. 
This question leads into the second form of the public sphere worry – 
that the full-face veil expresses or symbolizes something 
antidemocratic. 
This expressivist worry itself takes several forms. The first is that 
the full-face veil is worn because of patriarchal coercion and is 
therefore a symbol of the subjugation of women. Suppose that is true. 
It does not obviously follow that a ban furthers the values of the 
democratic public sphere. There could still be some women who wear 
the full-face veil autonomously. If so, the ban would violate their 
freedom of expression and/or religion. The ban would also express a 
condemnation of these women’s choices. Second, as Nussbaum 
argues, many sartorial choices are the product of coercion or 
oppressive social norms, so without further argument about the 
expressive content of the veil there is not an adequate reason to single 
it out while not banning many other things. Also, if the real problem is 
coercion, it would seem the proper ban would be on coercing women 
to wear the veil, not on wearing the veil itself. A law criminalizing 
such coercion would support the values of the democratic public 
sphere. A ban on the veil instead attempts to defend the democratic 
public sphere via a constraint on liberty. It also is unclear how those 
who are thought to be coercing women to wear the veil would respond 
to the ban. Would they engage in further abuse, or prevent these 
already coerced women from participating in the public sphere at all?   
The second form of the expressivist worry is that never revealing 
one’s face in public is incompatible with equal standing and 
participation in the public sphere. So if the veil is something that one 
will always wear in the public sphere, this expresses a refusal to fully 
engage with one’s fellow citizens. In the debate on the Danish law, 
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Preben Bang Henriksen (Venstre (V)) stated that “It is important in 
our society that we can meet face to face in a trustworthy relationship, 
a trust that is essentially based on the ability to read facial 
expressions”.1 Surely the ability to read facial expressions can 
augment transparency, reciprocity, and trust, but it is not clear that it is 
essential. That requires further argument. If one can still communicate 
in the public sphere, perhaps adequate transparency, reciprocity, and 
trust are possible. 
The third form of the worry is that the full-face veil expresses some 
form of antidemocratic worldview, either religious, traditional, and/or 
political. The veil is thought to be worn by those who want to 
construct a parallel society, who reject gender equality, or have other 
forms of antidemocratic values. (There are, of course, also nationalist 
and ethnocentric versions of the symbolic worry.) Bang Henriksen 
stressed integration as a reason in favor of the Danish burqa ban. He 
believes that this would hinder the creation of a parallel society.   
Suppose those who argue that the veil expresses anti-democratic 
values are correct. The unanswered question is why this particular 
form of antidemocratic expression should be banned. In most 
democracies one has the liberty to wear clothing with antidemocratic 
slogans, to wave antidemocratic flags, etc. Exceptions to this typically 
require special circumstances or some type of emergency. Nussbaum 
discusses Turkey’s ban of veiling as a response to unveiled women 
being abused in the public sphere. Germany has stronger restrictions 
on expression than most democracies for historical reasons. Yet in 
general, one is free to wear or display anti-democratic symbols, 
statements, and flags in the democratic public sphere. If the full-face 
                                                 
1. Folketinget [National Parliament], 1. Behandling af  Lovforslag nr. L 219: Forslag til Lov 
om Ændring as Straffeloven (Tildækningsforbud) [1. Reading of L 219: Proposal for 
Amendment of the Penal Law (Cover Ban)], 19 April 2018 (as presented by Danish 
Minister of Justice on 4 April, 2017), available at  
<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20171/lovforslag/l219/beh1/forhandling.htm#speak0>; National 
Parliament, Preben Bang Henriksen, available at  
<https://www.ft.dk/da/medlemmer/folketingetsmedlemmer/preben-bang-henriksen-(v)>. 
Note that V is a Danish political party with historical roots in the emancipation and equality 
of the peasantry and a millennium vision of a “Future in freedom and community” where 
the latter entails a policy of increased European integration. Concerning freedom, the 
program of V prescribes that “the human thrives best in freedom [and] under [individual] 
responsibility. Freedom means the absence of coercion…“ See Venstre, available at 
<https://www.venstre.dk/>; <https://www.venstre.dk/partiet/skoleweb/liberal-politik>. 
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veil is essentially tied up with oppression and gender inequality, then 
that can be countered in the public sphere through discourse and by 
striving for equality of opportunity for women.  
It is not clear that a constraint on liberty is necessary to answer this 
alleged challenge to the democratic public sphere. When such 
constraints lack adequate justification, or are inconsistent with the 
treatment of similar conduct, or are not the response to a genuine 
emergency, they can allow fear or animus or authoritarian impulses to 
restrict freedoms. Even if the objections that the veil physically 
prevents open interaction or expresses anti-democratic values are 
compelling, we lack convincing evidence that this justifies a ban. 
 
VI.  Dr. Bronik Matwijkiw: 
The Emperor’s New Clothes: Denmark and Burqa-Wearing 
Women 
Part of the reasoning behind the so-called burqa ban appears to 
depend on the Danish MPs cum legislators’ misunderstood view of 
Islam as a religion. In particular, this seems to be the case when they 
announce that their intention is to curtail and combat what they 
describe as “political Islam”.1  
Political Islam supposedly captures the following meanings and 
situations, namely that some Muslims plan to commit violent acts of 
terrorism and/or try to undermine Western institutions. The latter is 
conceptualized in terms of a “rejection of Danish values”.2 However, 
                                                 
1. In a 2010 CNN interview, MP Naser Khader (Conservative People’s Party (K)) stated that 
the “the burqa and niqab have no place in Western Europe” and that the relevant dress code 
is an integral part of political Islam. Furthermore, MP Martin Henriksen (Danish People’s 
Party (DK)) insisted that “Islam is not just a religion, it is also an ideological and social-
political movement”. Finally, the Danish Minister of Justice Søren Pape Poulsen (K) 
declared the burqa “incompatible” with the values of the Danish society. See Tom Evans, 
Burqa becomes focus of tense debate in Europe, CNN, 3 February 2010 available at 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/02/03/europe.burqa/index.html>; Ritzau, 
Khadar: Danskerne er imod politisk Islam, Berlingske, 3 February 2010, available at 
<https://www.b.dk/politiko/khader-danskerne-er-imod-politisk-islam>; Danish Ministry of 
Justice, Tildækningsforbud skal øge respect for fællesskabet og bekæmpe 
parallelsamfund, 6 February 2018, available at  
<http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2018/ 
tildaekningsforbud -skal-oege-respekt-faellesskabet-og-bekaempe>. 
2. Danish Ministry of Justice, Forslag (og Bemærkninger) til Lov om Ændring af 
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it is absurd to suggest that a woman who wears a burqa signals or 
indicates (simply by virtue of wearing the relevant full-face veil) that 
she may be involved in a future (9/11 style) attack. It is likely that the 
said woman is skeptical or critical towards various Western 
institutions and their underpinning values, but this response does not 
introduce a sharp and significant distinction between her and Danish 
citizens who are in partial or total disagreement with the political 
system in Denmark. To assume otherwise is erroneous and, 
concerning burqa-wearers, serious stereotyping.  
In the Muslim part of the world, there are different views of the 
relationship between religion and politics, regardless of women’s 
dress code. Admittedly, the founder of Islam, Muhammad (571-632 
AD), was both a prophet and a reformer, both a religious leader and an 
administrator, both a politician and a military leader. This does not 
mean that a Muslim country does not or cannot separate religious 
authority and political control, (cf. policy and law). Certainly, Turkey 
is one example of a secular state, founded on the state (politics) versus 
religion idea or, stronger still, ideal.1 The Islamic state that enforces 
shariʿa integrates (as opposed to separates) the two areas, although 
experts argue that Islamic tradition and Islamic principles historically 
support the “non-Islamic” state phenomenon.2 Thus, law based on 
civic reasons and, more generally, human rights constitute the burqa-
wearers’ stakes in the Danish controversy.  
                                                                                                                   
Straffeloven (Tildækningsforbud) [Proposal (and Commentaries) for Amendment of the 
Penal Law (Cover Ban)], 11 April 2018, 2, available at  
<http://www.ft.dk/da/search?msf=&q=tild%C3%A6kningsforbud&as=1>. 
1. Turkey declines to sponsor any state religion (unlike Denmark which has not disestablished 
the Lutheran Church of Denmark), in compliance with the Constitution of 1928. The list of 
countries that recognize Islam as their official religion encompasses states with Sunni Islam 
(e.g., Somalia and Pakistan) and Shi’a Islam (e.g., Iran). These do not separate religion and 
state politics. Examples of other countries that, according to researchers, “favor Islam” 
without naming it as their official religion, are Sudan and Syria. See Sarah Eekhoff Zykstra, 
Pew: Islamic Is Most Official But Christianity Is Most Favored Worldwide, CT, 3 October 
2017, available at <https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2017/october/pew-islam-
most-official-state-religion-christianity-favored.html>. 
France is listed as a country that officially endorses a separation of church and state while 
introducing a (new) “category” that strictly blurs the separation with restrictions on 
religious practices, such as the ban on face coverings in public. See id; Humeyra Pamuk, 
Turkey lifts generations-old ban on Islamic head scarf, Reuters, 8 October 2013, available 
at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-headscarf-ban-idUSBRE99708720131008>. 
2. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE 
FUTURE OF SHARI`A (2010). 
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As it happens, the Danish MPs cum legislators’ sweeping 
generalizations may be pragmatically effective to the extent that the 
burqa is politicized in the wake of these.1 Upon reflection, the strategy 
also helps to raise a key question: Why do Danish legislators more or 
less tacitly emphasize (Danish) nationality when they refer to ideas 
that characterize liberal democracy, such as transparency and 
openness? Instead of describing the burqa-wearers’ rejection of the 
ideas, as they perceive them, the Danish legislators describe the 
wearing of the burqa per se as a rejection of Danish values, thereby 
interjecting their own automatic “logic” on behalf of the people they 
represent. In other words, they suggest that all or most Danes share the 
same values and, by extension, all or most Danes are also assumed to 
consent to a particular interpretation of particular garments. 
Furthermore, it follows that, if the wearers of particular garments 
do not agree with values that are described as Danish, they cannot join 
or come to belong to the Danish people. Since the Danish MPs cum 
legislators believe that it is not Danish to wear the burqa, the female 
wearers have to be stripped of it, in effect, to speed up the 
socialization process that they, i.e., the Danish legislators also 
perceive as an “integration” into the mainstream society.2  
At the meta-level of analysis, it is possible to ascertain that value 
incompatibility, according to  Danish value politics, points to “proper 
form” – the idea that this must and, mutatis mutandis, should be made 
the criterion for appropriateness (cf. formalism) as The Supreme 
Danish Value.3 Very briefly, formalism issues non-negotiable 
prescriptions applicable to, inter alia, one’s appearance, 
communication, interaction, and even for one’s thoughts and beliefs. 
The emphasis on proper form over substance has the immediate effect 
of rendering rational argument irrelevant, just as the resulting “Law of 
1. Supra note 79.
2. Part of the Danish government’s reasoning consists in the belief that law L 219 will 
“promote and facilitate social interaction and coexistence, which is crucial in society, 
because it contributes to letting people in Denmark meet one another in a proper way –
with trust and respect, face to face”. See Danish Ministry of Justice, Draft – Proposal for 
Penal Law (Cover Ban), available at
<http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2018/lovf 
orslag_tildaekningsforbud.pdf>.
3. AKSEL SANDEMOSE, A FUGITIVE CROSSES HIS TRACKS I-II, I-30, I-197 77 (4th ed., 1968)
(1933) [Eng. transl.1936].
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Jante” operates on the basis of aversions towards deviance from and 
non-conformity with the norms (read: Danish values) and, in the final 
analysis, the culturally underlying “millimeter-democracy” that 
translates equality into sameness.1 By extension, the concept of the 
Danish people implies that individuals in “the public space” (should) 
look and behave in a uniform way while, at the same time, being 
allowed to wear the burqa behind closed doors and drawn curtains.  
Interestingly enough, the private-public distinction has historically 
worked against the liberation of women and their rights, especially in 
the opinion of feminists; and in 2018 women are, once again, at a 
serious risk of being relegated to the home sphere – a reactionary 
outcome that feminists link with a gender-specific and patriarchic, if 
not, misogynistic response. However, if Muslim women are not “just 
like the Danish women”, then that is the problem. The hope, so it 
seems, is that differences can be made invisible (by law-making) as 
long as they, i.e., the Danish MPs cum legislators describe them as a 
rejection of Danish values. 
In turn, such a game-changer functions to cement the “status” of 
asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants in general who are not 
recognized as real Danes, but, at the most, as Danes with a different 
ethnic background. The prominent Danish politician Bertel Haarder 
once said at a meeting in Copenhagen that Denmark “is a tribe – not a 
country”.2 At the point in time, Haarder saw this as a problem in the 
light of the efforts of the European Union to create a community of 
shared values across borders, to insert the Social Cohesion Glue 
between the Member States. Today, seventeen years after the 
interview, a growing number of people want the borders closed 
because of the refugee crisis in Europe. The burqa ban, law L 219, is a 
symbol of the “awakening” of the Danish people, i.e., the nationalist 
feelings that threaten (to undermine) international cooperation. 
Undoubtedly, talk about “Danish values” and, more generally, “the 
Danish people” also refer to a commitment to Denmark’s protestant 
                                                 
1. On Sandemose’s premises, the Danish millimeter-democracy functions like a ruler that measures 
and then cuts everybody down to the same size, meaning that people who try to “rise above” the 
average and typical (cum proper form) of being and co-existing are met with retaliatory 
measures, in particular, non-recognition and exclusion from the group. See id., I-111. 
2. Staff Writer, Danmark er en stamme – ikke et land, DR, 21 January 2002, available at 
<https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/danmark-er-en-stamme-ikke-et-land>. 
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version of Christianity. In other words, the burqa represents a 
“rejection” of this commitment. Although Danes often see themselves 
as atheists, they nevertheless conform to certain protestant rituals or 
ceremonies at special occasions, such as weddings, funerals or, for 
that matter, the so-called “confirmation” (ritual) of their faith. From a 
religious perspective, their way of life reflects “bad faith” – an attempt 
to believe and behave as if they are Christians when, in fact, they are 
not.1 The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard even accuses the 
Danes of hypocrisy because they tend to make Christianity an outward 
as opposed to an inner spiritual experience that sincerely commits 
them to God.2 The German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach addresses 
a similar factor. Furthermore, in Feuerbach’s discussion of religion, 
the emphasis is on Christianity and not Islam or other religions. Like 
Kierkegaard, Feuerbach takes a Western perspective. However, and 
contrary to Kierkegaard, Feuerbach adopts a materialist approach to 
the issue of religion.3 For the same reason, Feuerbach focuses 
attention on what the concept of God means in a social context, how 
religion develops historically and, with this, on comprehension (rather 
than hypocrisy). For example, people pray to God because they want 
God the omniscient and omnipotent to intervene in a situation that 
they (believe they) cannot handle or change themselves. Feuerbach’s 
point is that not God, but our own species possesses the knowledge 
and power needed to accomplish things we cannot even dream of 
doing individually. Hence, the concept of God represents humanity in 
an alienated form. The implied comprehension problem and failure 
emerges because humanity is just an idea, something abstract. In the 
real world, we do not see “humanity” but only “countless, separate, 
                                                 
1. On Sandemose’s premises, bad faith is an integral part of formalism. See SANDEMOSE, 
supra note 85, at 62; Jesper B. Pedersen, Forsker: Danmark er verdens mindst religiøse 
land, Århus Stifttidende, 29 July 2013, available at <https://stiften.dk/aarhus/Forsker-
Danmark-er-verdens-mindst-religioese-land/artikel/167025> (for Denmark as “the least 
religious country in the world”); Carsten H. Nielsen, Præst: Kulturkristne danskere vil være 
kristne og ateister på same tid, Kristendom.dk, 6 March 2014, <available at 
https://www.kristendom.dk/kommentaren/pr%C3%A6st-kulturkristne-danskere-vil-
v%C3%A6re-kristne-og-ateister-p%C3%A5-samme-tid> (for ”Danish cultural Christians” 
as non-religious Protestants). 
2. See generally SØREN KIERKEGAARD, ØIEBLIKKET 1-10 [THE MOMENT in English] (1964) 
(1855) 
3. LUDWIG A. FEUERBACH, DAS WESEN DES CHRISTENTUMS (1841), cited in DANIEL BRUDNEY, 
MARX’S ATTEMPT TO LEAVE PHILOSOPHY (1998) [hereinafter BRUDNEY]. 
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limited individuals”.1 Notwithstanding, Feuerbach insists that religion 
will disappear once people understand the anthropomorphic qualities 
and properties of God and, equipped with this comprehension, come 
to realize that God is a projection, more precisely, a reflection of our 
self-consciousness. Although perhaps a paradox, people still pray to 
God – instead of drawing the consequence of their life form cum 
potential liberation and empowerment (through an epistemological 
analogy to Maslow’s self-recognition and -realization). 
Assuming that the women who wear the burqa believe that it is 
their religious duty to wear the garment in question, it seems 
inconsistent to prohibit them from wearing it if the Danes believe in 
religious freedom. As a matter of fact, religious freedom is granted as 
a constitutional right in Denmark. This is probably one reason why the 
Danish MPs cum legislators link their mandatory dress code to 
“political Islam”. If their dress code is more about “political 
extremism” than religion, the burqa is not protected by the Danish 
Constitution. Furthermore, if the burqa signals or is indicative of the 
idea that terrorist acts may be justified for religious reasons, the 
Danish MPs cum legislators have a duty to protect the Danish people 
against the implied threat. However, the prohibition itself does not 
seem to remove any threat. It is not the burqa, but the mindset of a 
particular individual that may cause a potential security issue. If the 
“protection of the rights and freedoms of others” is invoked and the 
ban is construed as justifiable to the extent that it strives to guarantee 
the conditions of “living together”, the Danish version of these French 
and Belgian premises (cf. S.A.S. v. France, Belkacemi/Oussar v. 
Belgium, and Dakir v. Belgium) seem to narrow the desired outcome 
so much that the reference to “respect for the community” boils down 
to the simple, in one sense at least, demand that “we must be able to 
see each other” (cf. face-recognition as the basis for transparency and 
trust).2 After all, the idea of human rights, which Denmark is also 
                                                 
1. Id., at 36. 
2. Staff Writer, Denmark passes ban on niqabs and burkas, BBC News, 31 May 2018, 
available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44319921>; Danish Ministry of 
Justice, supra note 80, at 2; ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, Grand 
Chamber, Judgment,  1 July 2014, paras. 141-142 (for (civility, fraternity and respect as 
conditions of) “living together” (le “vivre ensemble”) as a legitimate goal of the restrictive 
measure and the incompatibility between systematic concealment of the face in public 
places and social interaction). 2 ECtHR, Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, Application  
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bound by in international treaties, is to avoid the kind of situation 
where a society’s choice or, the choice of anybody in power, can 
sacrifice The Other on the altar of social utility. The relevant rights are 
protections of human beings as against fellow human beings or 
“Man’s Inhumanity to Man”.1 Thus, by confirming the broad 
discretion on behalf of the Member State, the European Court of 
Human Rights opted for optimal relativity as regards the functioning 
of a democratic society (including interaction, dialogue, and 
communication, as stressed by Denmark) at the expense of the 
freedom of a minority of already vulnerable Muslims. 
Apparently the Danish MPs cum legislators do not want to 
officially state that God is just another name for our species in the 
course of emphasizing that they are concerned about the Danish 
values, and not the burqa-wearers’ religious alienation or oppression. 
They evade the religious issue, and seem to do so for several reasons: 
(1) they do not want the 2018 burqa ban repealed as unconstitutional, 
(2) they want a secularized society, and (3) they do not want to 
address the issue from different perspectives.  
The first reason (cf. 1) is particularly important on the basis of the 
materialism-secularism constellation. If Feuerbach’s theory is applied 
to Muslim women, a kind of cultural “shock and awe” effect occurs. 
The premises cannot be disclosed; for the idea of using law is 
tantamount to inflicting an untimely “social death” on behalf of 
women who have a different background – and that is intolerance.2 
The second reason (cf. 2) reflects the modern radicalization of Danish 
politics.3 In 1999, the founder of the Danish People’s Party (DK), Ms. 
                                                                                                                   
No. 37798/13, Grand Chamber, Judgment, 11 July 2017; Dakir v. Belgium, Application 
No. 4619/12, Judgment, 11 July 2017. 
1. MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN (L.C. Vohah & Michael Bohlander eds., 2003); ROBERT 
BURNS, POEMS AND SONGS, Harvard Classics Vol. 6 (2015) (1784). 
2. On the premises of materialism, the evolutionary process, which is partially determined by 
the economic conditions, cannot be expedited by law or other measures or means. This 
introduces an inconsistency on behalf of a secular state like Denmark. According to 
Feuerbach – and especially given the Danish MPs cum legislators’ belief in liberal 
democracy, the right thing to do is to promote an open discussion where all parties submit 
to rational arguments. – This is the recommendation. 
3. C. J. Werleman defines the prohibitive measure itself (i.e., the burqa ban of right-wing 
legislators) as “a form of secular extremism, no more, or no less insidious or 
threatening than religious forms of extremism”. See C. J. Werleman, Denmark’s burqa 
ban: A lurch towards secular extremism, The New Arab, 6 June 2018, available at 
<https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/6/6/denmarks-burqa-ban-a-lurch-
towards-secular-extremism>. 
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Pia Kjærsgaard, proposed that an immigrant family should be expelled 
from Denmark if second or third generation members had committed 
serial acts of serious criminality. The now former Prime Minister Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen replied that DK would never be “house trained”, 
thereby dismissing the idea of policymaking.1 Today, in 2018, Ms. 
Kjærsgaard is the Speaker of the House (since 2015), a position the 
prestige of which is surpassed only by Queen Margrethe II. 
Furthermore, Nyrup Rasmussen’s Social Democratic Party (SD) 
supports, together with the current VLAK-coalition government, the 
anti-foreigner agenda of DK, which abstained from forming a 
government in 2015 despite its successful election.2 
As regards the third reason (cf. 3), it is regrettable that the Danish 
MPs cum legislators do not tolerate or even care about how women 
who wear the burqa or the niqab see things. Admittedly, they believe 
that the relevant Muslim women are victims of negative social control. 
However, the women do not agree. They perceive the state as a hostile 
force. For some of them, their dress code is part of their relationship 
with God. They also want protection against sexual objectification. 
The “Me Too” movement seems to confirm such a need in Western 
countries. The Danish MPs cum legislators have a right, of course, to 
disagree with this. However, this raises another key question: If the 
women are victims of a male dominated culture that imposes the 
burqa/niqab irrespective of their own preferences, will a ban on their 
dress code change that situation?  
However sincerely held the belief in oppression may be, it is ill-
founded in the sense that it is naïve to suggest that a society can fight 
gender inequality and other forms of injustice solely with the use of 
legislative means and measures. To strengthen their argument, as it 
were, they also claim that burqa-wearers will never be able to find 
employment in Denmark, as a direct consequence of the full-face veil. 
Even if true, it is not possible to derive a license to judge. And, who is 
to judge which clothes people should wear? In a liberal democracy, 
the government is not supposed to regulate people’s (choice and view 
                                                 
1. Office of the Danish State, Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Opening Speech in 1999, 
available at <http://www.stm.dk/_p_7628.html>. 
2. Sine R. Lund, DK: Derfor gik vi ikke i regering, Altinget, 5 August 2015, available at 
<https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/df-derfor-gik-vi-ikke-i-regering> (for DK’s political 
power calculation). 
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of) clothes, fashion, etc. A (liberal) appeal to other-regarding harm, 
freedom, autonomy or, more generally, the rights of others misfires 
unless the nature and scope of the injury, damage or loss they stand to 
suffer warrants limits. As a principle, it holds that reciprocal stakes in 
important interests deserve to be protected. Be that as it may, the so-
called choice of society does not support reciprocity, but instead 
subtracts from this.1 
In the light of this, the Big Question is: Do the burqa-wearers pose 
a threat to democracy, as alleged by various Danish MPs cum 
legislators, or do they pose a threat to their nationalist feelings?  
Law L 219 may end the wearing of full-face veils like the burqa. If 
so, Muslim women are going to be proven right in that it will hold (for 
them) that “I cannot be a believer. Or that I am not allowed to practice 
my faith”.2 Critically, however, burqa-wearers have no revolutionary 
potential in the sense that they are not capable of mobilizing the 
Danes to turn against the current political institutions, which revolve 
around the idea of national pride and/or revival. The burqa-wearers, 
so it seems to follow, are a political scapegoat. In turn, the new law is 
a sign of a moral and political crisis. If anything, it constitutes a threat 
to liberal democracy camouflaged as a defense of values. In the words 
of Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan:  
By banning the burqa, banning the way people are 
dressing, we are against our own values… In fact, we 
are nurturing fear, and we are not having a constructive 
debate. Islam is a European religion, and it's part of 
society.3 
                                                 
1. The same trend can be ascertained in the case of other restrictive measures that Denmark 
has recently introduced for immigrants in general. See Staff Writer, Is this Europe’s most 
drastic move yet against ‘migrant ghettos’?, The World Weekly, 9 March 2018, available 
at <https://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/view/16044/is-this-europes-most-drastic-
move-yet-against-migrant-ghettos>. 
2. Ritzau, Niqab-klædt kvinde: Burkaforbud er social kontrol fra staten, Jyllands-Posten, 4 
June 2018,  available at  
<https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE10489443/niqabklaedt-kvinde-burkaforbud-er-
social-kontrol-fra-staten>; Kvinder i Dialog, available at <http://www.kvinderidialog.dk> 
and <https://iphone.facebook.com/kvinderidialog/?__tn__=CH-R> (for the new grassroots 
movement in Denmark Women in Dialogue that consists of both burqa/niqab-wearers and 
non-wearers who agree that the Danish ban constitutes a strategy of “discrimination, 
criminalization and oppression” and who are committed to the activist goal of protest and 
demonstration, especially on 1 August 2018 where the ban enters into force. One of the 
slogans of Women in Dialogue is “No to liberal hypocrisy”. 
3. Evans, supra note 79. 
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 “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, written by H. C. Andersen’s in 
1837, captures the absurdity of the situation. In this fairy tale, the 
Emperor wants his subjects to admire his new clothes in a public 
procession, but then the weavers report that only intelligent people 
will be able to see them. However, nobody can see the Emperor’s new 
clothes. And nobody wants to be perceived, per Feuerbach’s 
terminology, as an intellectual imbecile either.1 Then a child exclaims: 
“But he hasn't got anything on!” The Emperor understands that they 
have all been deceived and swindled, and therefore he continues as if 
he did wear his new clothes… and his noblemen hold the train that is 
not even there.2 
The morale of the fairy tale is: Too much control and pressure from 
MPs cum legislatures can turn people into involuntary H. C. 
Andersen-type of simpletons. 
 
VII.  Dr. Anja Matwijkiw (Research Director): 
A Set of Recommendations 
All the authors have one end-goal in common, namely to inform 
about various important perspectives while at the same time opening 
up for parameters for (more) fruitful, constructive and (if need be) 
critical debate in the future. As for this, the strategy adopted consists 
in an attempt to present a set of recommendations that may function to 
minimize any polarization effect or enhance the quality of the debate, 
or both. 
Below, the research director for the research project defines four 
recommendations in total; all of which flow directly from the project 
itself. If implemented, the four recommendations negate attempts to 
reduce the distinction, as applied by Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo in the 
area of international law and international relations, between 
“controllers and the controlled” to a separation (ideology), thereby 
also avoiding the (illiberal) Right is Might philosophy this entails.3  
                                                 
1. BRUDNEY, supra note 90, at 44. 
2. H. C. Andersen Centre, available at  
<http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheEmperorsNewClothes_e.html>. 
3. See Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, The Law of the Global Community: An Integrated System to 
Enforce “Public”International Law, 1 GLOBAL COMMUNITY YILJ 71, 75, 77, 104, 
115, 119 (2001). 
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The recommendations accommodate author input from individual 
contributors.1 Furthermore, they are intended as a holistic tool for 
conflict-resolution. In particular, the tool targets discrepancies between, 
on the one hand, ethics and critical thinking and, on the other hand, real-
world phenomena, processes or procedures that may jeopardize the 
overarching goal of preventing a reduction of right to might.   
The format of the recommendations includes a general 
recommendation, a specific context for the recommendation, and a 
rationale. While the general recommendation is the guideline, the specific 
context for the recommendation briefly explains the larger situation, 
challenge or controversy that gave rise to it, whereas the rationale helps 
to capture the more subtle and, invoking M. Cherif Bassiouni’s method, 
“deep theory” aspect/s of the situation, challenge or controversy.2 
 
I .General Recommendation:  
To avoid methods of conceptualization that may introduce 
interpretative arbitrariness, thereby obstructing justice as well as 
clarity. 
  
Specific Context for the Recommendation:  
The way that pluralism has been interpreted gives rise to a need for 
enhanced awareness of the premises for defining the meaning and 
scope of central terms and/or positions that play an important role in a 
democratic society. 
S.A.S. v. France, Belkacemi/Oussar v. Belgium, and Dakir v. 
Belgium serve as examples. These demonstrate that de jure 
“pluralism” may be modified through the introduction of various sub-
distinctions between respectively ideological-political pluralism, 
cultural pluralism and religious pluralism; and with the outcome of 
making “religious pluralism” the least pluralist position on 
comparison.  
                                                 
1. The names of individual contributors are on file with the research director, who assumes 
the full and sole responsibility for the recommendations. However, a special thank you 
should be extended to, respectively, Dr. Baldwin for recommendation III and Dr. Mack for 
recommendation IV.  
2. Anja Matwijkiw & Bronik Matwijkiw, A Modern Perspective on International Criminal 
Law: Accountability as a Meta-Right, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI 68 (Leila N. Sadat & Michael 
P. Scharf eds., 2008). 
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The Rationale:  
If the premises of terms and/or positions that, so far, have informed 
and guided argument and reasoning are changed sufficiently, the 
implications may be far-reaching, so far-reaching that a new position 
may result (which requires a new name). In the case of pluralism, this 
can be illustrated by the fact that pluralism, traditionally and typically, 
have operated as a position which – like its counterpart in ethics, 
“relativism” – requires tolerance for the ways and beliefs and, more 
generally, values of other groups without (i) censuring their values in 
the process of confirming the underpinning equality of different and 
mutually exclusive outlooks, and (ii) without making some aspect of a 
normative area more or less pluralist or, for that matter, relativist, on 
comparison. As for (i), the test of pluralism and, for that matter, 
relativism is value incompatibility. However, in the event that a legal 
case changes this conditio sine qua non for definition (sufficiently) 
and, as a consequence of rule-application, in effect, changes the 
accompanying scope for tolerance premise (sufficiently), a review of 
the premises for the position per se should take place.  
 
II. General Recommendation:  
To secure fact-finding that accords with the current society’s actual 
state of affairs and developmental stage.  
 
Specific Context for the Recommendation:  
The Danish MPs cum legislators responsible for the adoption of 
law L 219 (cf. Cover Ban of 31 May 2018) make it hold as a premise 
that Danish values preclude the burqa (cf. incompatibility) which, in 
turn, is viewed as an integral part of political Islam. 
If Islam is treated as a non-Western phenomenon although experts 
list Islam as a European religion, a value-fact problem emerges, one 
that conflates “is” and “ought”, description and prescription.  
 
The Rationale:  
Rigorous and accurate research is needed for the purpose of 
providing a  
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descriptive analysis, which can be distinguished, qua fact-finding, 
from an evaluative  
assessment. In the case at hand, the information is outdated and, 
consequently, it distorts the truth defined as a value and a right. In the 
context of law at the international level, the right to truth has been 
ascribed status as a special right on behalf of victims of serious human 
rights violations. More precisely, the right to truth functions as an 
accountability-securing measure (cf. justice). 
The empirical truth that is involved in fact-finding should be 
checked by professional researchers, who have the necessary expertise 
to examine and determine the origin and credibility of sources and 
data, thereby also testing the empirical/factual basis of any claims or 
statements which are made and which function to guide other people’s 
opinions. 
In particular, in a so-called Fake News era, information is 
controversial in the sense that values or prescriptions (cf. evaluative 
assessment) may entirely replace facts (cf. descriptive analysis), and 
the area of politics serves as a paradigm example of this unethical 
practice. Given that information may also be non-descriptive by virtue 
of being descriptively inadequate, a recommendation for fact-finding 
should include full coverage. Descriptive analysis should encompass, 
as a minimum, the affected stakeholders, thereby also securing a 
balanced information-gathering method.  
 
III.  General Recommendation:  
To accommodate otherness that is consistent with shared values – 
despite claims to the opposite effect. In many instances, there is 
common ground between incompatible conceptualizations and the 
values per se. 
 
Specific Context for the Recommendation:  
The reasoning of the French Conseil d’État and ECtHR to uphold 
the burqa ban did not accommodate all key aspects of the multi-
stakeholder reality, in accordance with the values that are assumed to 
constitute foundation stones and, ipso facto, grounds for 
representation. 
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The Rationale:  
While it is reasonable to expect that people show some measure of 
respect for the fundamental values of the country they live in, inter 
alia, equality, liberty and fraternity, the courts (both in the EU and in 
the US) should consider the various levels of values, including their 
nature and status, as well as their interpretation in a variety of 
(stakeholder) contexts. Values may be expressed differently by people 
from different religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, but the 
incompatible conceptualizations that follow may also be anchored in 
what amounts to shared values. Thus, values may both serve to 
separate (alienate, marginalize, etc.) and unite people living within a 
(nation) state or union of (nation) states – depending on the line of 
reasoning that is provided.  
One implication of the reasoning of the French Conseil d’État and 
ECtHR would require the state to coerce so-called “anti-social” people 
with the threat of sanction or punishment to fraternize with others. 
Critically, it could be objected that banning women from wearing the 
burqa and forcing “anti-social” people to fraternize are relevantly 
disanalogous, meaning that the burqa ban is contrary to “living 
together” whereas enforced fraternity is a measure that is geared 
towards “living together”.1 That aside, even on the assumption that 
fraternity is a fundamental value of a pluralistic liberal democracy, for 
a state or government to force certain stakeholders to give up their 
form of (co-)existence, however non-violent in fact discords with 
another fundamental value, namely liberty.  
 
IV. General Recommendation: 
That courts, especially the United States Supreme Court (USSC), 
should carefully and self-critically consider the intent and impact (in 
connection with the current examination of words and authority) of 
presidential proclamations in the area of refugees, thereby instituting 
procedures and criteria that are analogous to the strict scrutiny tests 
that apply to so-called suspect classification, e.g., race.2 
 
                                                 
1. I owe this insight to Dr. Baldwin. 
2. I credit Dr. Mack for this point of view. 
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Specific Context for Recommendation: 
That the USSC did not convincingly avoid the appearance of a 
politically biased interpretation when it ruled in the Trump v. Hawaii 
travel ban case in April of 2018.  
 
Rationale:  
A slippery slope – from travel to burqa ban in America – is a 
probability, which must be addressed. At the present point in time, 
there is a legal vacuum. The scope of protections for burqa-wearers 
for personal reasons has not yet been determined by the USSC, and 
the absence of defined limits cannot but make “rights” to burqa-
wearing precarious. The same is true of international refugee law, 
which the U.S. Congress has otherwise ratified. The international 
obligations pertaining to, inter alia, family unification, are not adhered 
to in a consistent manner, especially in cases concerning refugees 
from Muslim countries. 
A formal set of procedures and criteria and, more importantly, a 
consistent implementation of these would eliminate the harmful 
effects of all undemocratic measures and techniques of subterfuge in 
the hands of (real-)politicians and government officials. 
Qua recommendations for legal doctrine and jurisprudence, 
informational accuracy, multi-stakeholder representation, and 
increased oversight, implementation would require the cooperation of 
experts from law and the humanities,1 especially since critical thinking 
skills are necessary to analyze and assess premises and implications 
that go beyond legal norms and rule-application as such. By virtue of 
the fact that the separation of law and ethics, an otherwise traditional 
feature of legal positivism, is rejected in progressive jurisprudential 
approaches that seek to raise the bar for the procedural and substantive 
aspects of law at the national and international levels, the 
collaboration in question has to be. To the extent that a philosophy of 
law-and-ethics together serves as an anti-dote to the Right is Might 
                                                 
1. For the centrality of humanistic values in (global) justice, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 
(2011); Anja Matwijkiw & Bronik Matwijkiw, The Value Question and Legal Doctrine: 
The Inescapability of Ethics, in (special issue) ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
(Anja Matwijkiw ed.), 16/2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 323 (2016). 
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philosophy that stems from political absolutism (cf. rulers/controllers 
versus the ruled/controlled), liberalism is assumed as a component, 
thereby also establishing democracy as a liberal system as opposed to 
an illiberal regime. It follows that freedom is a very special interest or 
stake. Consequently, restrictions of rights that protect it must and 
indeed should be considered accordingly. The fact that there is a 
European trend to do the opposite does not serve to justify a measure 
on behalf of a particular country. At best, the step of “jumping on the 
bandwagon” can be construed as an opportunistic response on behalf 
of MPs who disagree with multi-stakeholder integration that 
transcends conservative or reactionary interpretations of national 
values; at worst, it is a signal of the closed society that historically has 
resulted in totalitarianism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
